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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Julian Martin Valencia pleaded guilty to battery
with the intent to commit a serious felony (rape). Mr. Valencia later filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, which the district court denied. The district court imposed a
unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Valencia asserts the
district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In January of 2013, Sara Negrete reported to the Nampa police that Julian Martin
Valencia had sexually assaulted her.

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,

PSI), p.2.) Ms. Negrete said that she was staying at her friend's apartment when the
assault occurred. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Valencia was her friend's boyfriend. (PSI, p.2.) When
interviewed regarding the incident, Mr. Valencia confirmed that he was at his girlfriend's
apartment despite the fact that there were three no contact orders between them. (PSI,
p.3.) Mr. Valencia said he had been drinking with his girlfriend and Ms. Negrete and
admitted that he went to Ms. Negrete's bedroom later and penetrated her with his
fingers.

(PSI, p.3.)

He was originally charged with battery with intent to commit a

serious felony to wit: rape, felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-911, and violation of a no
contact order (third offense within five years), felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-920(3).
(R., pp.8-10.)

He was offered two plea agreement options: a binding Rule 11

agreement for both charges, and an offer to plead guilty to the battery charge only.

1

(Tr. 7/11/13, p.5.) He chose the latter. 1 (Tr. 7/11/13, p.5.) Therefore, in July of 2013,
Mr. Valencia entered an Alford2 plea to the charge of battery with intent to commit a
serious felony, and the State agreed to dismiss the other charge and recommend four
years fixed with the indeterminate portion of the sentence to remain open for argument.
(Tr. 7/11/13, p.7.)
Shortly thereafter, on September 25, 2013 (two days before Mr. Valencia's
psychosexual evaluation was filed with the district court 3 ) Mr. Valencia's counsel
(J. Scott Dowdy) filed a motion to withdraw as counsel of record for Mr. Valencia.
(R., pp.66-67.) In that motion, Mr. Dowdy explained that Mr. Valencia had asked him to
file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
(R., p.66.) Mr. Dowdy also stated that Mr. Valencia believed that he was not properly
advised on the consequences of his guilty plea, and that this rendered his plea
involuntary and unknowing. (R., p.66.) Therefore, Mr. Dowdy asked to be allowed to
withdraw, as it would be "impossible to further represent Defendant in his request for a
withdrawal of plea on this basis." 4 (R., p.66.)

1

Judge Ford was initially presiding over the case because the no contact order violation
was assigned to him. (Tr. 7/11/13, p.6.) However, because Mr. Valencia decided to
plead guilty to the battery charge only, which was assigned to Judge Southworth, Judge
Ford asked Judge Southworth to step in. (Tr. 7/11/13, p.6.) He did so immediately, and
this obviously troubled Mr. Valencia, as his counsel said that he had anticipated that
Judge Ford would be handling the case, so he was apprehensive to move forward with
a plea because he had never been in front of Judge Southworth. (Tr. 7/11/13, pp.8-9.)
Nevertheless, he pleaded guilty. (Tr. 7/11 /13, p.10.) Judge Southworth presided over
the proceedings from this point forward.
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
3 The PSI was filed with the district court on September 9, 2013, but the psychosexual
evaluation was not filed until September 27, 2013. (PSI, p.1; Psychosexual Evaluation
cover letter.) Idaho Criminal Rule 32(b)(10) states that the psychosexual evaluation
must be part of the PSI. Thus, Mr. Valencia should not have received either of those
documents until September 27, 2013 at the earliest.
4 There were indications that there was a lack of communication developing between
Mr. Valencia and Mr. Dowdy well before Mr. Dowdy filed his motion to withdraw as
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At the subsequent hearing on Mr. Dowdy's rnotion, the district court said that it
had just met with both of the attorneys in chambers and learned that
[t]he defendant Mr. Valencia filed some sort of motion with the case that
was ex parte without copies going to both parties, indicated he was very
unhappy with Mr. Dowdy's representation of him, not wanting Mr. Dowdy
to represent him anymore, and threatening Mr. Dowdy that he would be
reported to the State Bar Association. 5
(Tr. 10/21/13, p.6, Ls.1-8.)

Mr. Valencia's motion was entitled "Motion to Withdraw

Guilty Plea" and was addressed to the district court, but the district court had not read it;
there was a stamp on it stating that, "Pursuant to administrative order #98-1," it had
been "opened by court personnel" but had not been "read or reviewed by the judge."
(Letter and Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (file stamped 10/2/'13) - augmented to the
record contemporaneously.)

In that motion, Mr. Valencia said he was "misled,

misinformed, tricked, coerced, and threatened to plead guilty .... " (Tr. 10/21/13, p.8,
Ls.5-9.)

Based on these facts, the district court said that "[i]t would be an obvious

violation of ethical duties to require" Mr. Dowdy to continue to represent Mr. Valencia
and granted Mr. Dowdy's motion to withdraw as counsel. (Tr. 10/21/13, p.8, Ls.15-21;
R., pp.70-71.)

The district court then told Mr. Valencia that he was no longer represented by
counsel and said it would "reappoint the public defender's office to represent" him.
(Tr. 10/21/13, p.8, L.22 - p.9, L.6.) It also reset his sentencing hearing for December
16, 2013, and said that this would "give defense counsel a chance to contact you, see
how you want to proceed, and proceed with filing whatever motions you feel it is

counsel. For example, Mr. Valencia did not complete his "Defendant's Version" of the
incident for the PSI. Instead, he wrote "My attorney never came to see me. He was
supposed to come on the 8th of August to help me fill it out. I'm sorry." (PSI, p.3.)
3

appropriate for your defense counsel to file then."

(Tr. 10/21/13, p.9, Ls.13-17.)

Mr. Valencia then said, "Well, when I spoke with Mr. Dowdy on September 16th ... I
spoke with him and told him that I wanted to withdraw my plea.' (Tr. 10/21/13, p.9,
Ls. ·18-21.) The district court told Mr. Valencia to talk with his new attorney about any
motions he wanted to file. (Tr. 10/2'1/13, p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.3.)
Mr. Valencia was not able to file his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, through
his newly-appointed public defender (Ryan Dowell), until December 13, 2013.
(R., pp.73-76.)

In that motion, he asserted that he felt "his prior counsel misled him

which led him to enter a guilty plea." (R., p.73.) Further, he argued that the State would
not be prejudiced by the withdrawal of his plea, as the case could be reset for trial.
(R., p.73.) The motion also explained that Mr. Valencia felt "pressured to accept the
offered resolution and has since determined that a jury trial would be a more
appropriate resolution of the case" because he did not feel that "he committed the crime
as alleged." (R., p.75.)
At the subsequent hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, Mr. Dowell
pointed out that Mr. Valencia was misled by his former counsel because there were
erroneous representations made to him regarding Idaho's persistent violator statute.
(Tr.12/30/13, p.13, Ls.11-18.) In short, Mr. Dowell argued that based on the fact that
Mr. Valencia had one prior felony conviction, and his former counsel's representations
regarding the two instant offenses, Mr. Valencia came to believe that he could be
subject to the persistent violator enhancement if he did not plead guilty. (Tr. 12/30/14,
p.13, L.11-p.14, L.19.)

5

See Letter and Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (file stamped 10/2/13) - augmented to
the record contemporaneously. This motion was signed and notarized; it was dated
September 21, 2013.
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Mr. Dowell explained that this was misleading because of established precedent
holding that convictions entered the same day or charged in the same information
should count as a single conviction for purposes of the persistent violator enhancement.
(Tr. 12/30/13, p.14, Ls.10-19.) Therefore, the violation of the no contact orders and the
battery charge would count as a single conviction only.

Thus, he suggested that

Mr. Valencia's prior counsel made inaccurate representations to him that led him to

plead guilty instead of opting to proceed to trial. (Tr. 12/30/13, p.14, Ls.3-25.) In sum,
he said Mr. Valencia felt "manipulated" to plead guilty based on the representations of
his prior counsel. (Tr. 12/30/13, p.14, Ls.20-22.)
The State argued that the case law was clear with respect to the fact that when
the district court decides on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after the presentence
investigation is complete, it should look more "skeptically" on that motion and the
motives behind it. (Tr. 12/30/13, p.15, L.12 - p.16, L.4.) And the district court stated
that there was no "threat by the State to file the persistent violator because that was not
part of the plea agreement." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.16, Ls.22-25.)
The State also argued that there would be prejudice to the State if Mr. Valencia's
motion was granted. It explained that this case was unique because "this isn't a dope
case" or "a theft case of a store. This is a case involving a situation where the defendant
is charged with battery with the intent to commit a serious felony, to wit, rape."
(Tr. 12/30/13, p.17, Ls.3-11.)

Therefore, there was a "victim who goes through the

victim cycle." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.17, Ls.16-19.) Based on that, the State asserted that
"while there may not be a ton of prejudice because I have to go back and try this case,
there certainly is prejudice to the victim" because "she now has to relive the night in

5

question, even though she's been given that opportunity to move forward, that obviously
provides prejudice." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.18, Ls.1-20.)
In reply, Mr. Dowell said that, when he first started working with Mr. Valencia and
discussing the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Mr. Valencia told him that he had not
yet seen the presentence investigation or the psychosexual evaluation. (Tr. ·12/30/13,
p.19, Ls.12-24.)

And, with respect to the prejudice issue, Mr. Valencia's counsel

pointed out that "the psychological issues that the alleged victim may have in this
matter" did not amount to prejudice to the State.

(Tr. 12/30/13, p.20, Ls.14-20.) He

argued that the State was not prejudiced because "they can still call their witnesses to
trial. All their witnesses should still be available." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.20, Ls.20-23.)
The district court found that the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was "only filed
after a very negative psychosexual evaluation was performed and a presentence
investigation report that recommended prison."

(Tr. 12/30/13, p.21, Ls.13-16.)

Additionally, it said that it believed there was prejudice to the State, "specifically
prejudice to the victim in this case thinking this matter had reached a resolution and the
sentence was going forward." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.21, L.23 - p.22, L.2.) Thus it denied the
motion and set the matter for sentencing. (Tr. 12/30/13, p.22, Ls. 7-9.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State requested that the district court impose a
unified sentence of twenty years, with four years fixed.

(Tr. 1/10/14, p.33, Ls.2-6.)

Mr. Valencia's counsel recommended that the district court impose a unified sentence of
six years, with one and one-half years fixed, but retain jurisdiction so that Mr. Valencia
could participate in a rider program and sex offender treatment. (Tr. 1/10/14, p.37, L.23
- p.38, L.9.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with four years
fixed. (Tr. 1/10/14, p.44, Ls.22-25; R., pp.94-95.) Mr. Valencia filed a notice of appeal
6

that was timely from the judgment of conviction.

(R., pp.100-103.)

He also filed an

Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, but the district court denied that
motion as welL 6 (R., pp.86-93, 110-113.)

6

Mr. Valencia is not challenging the denial of his Rule 35 motion.
7

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Valencia's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea?

8

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Valencia's Motion To
Withdraw His Guiltv Plea
A.

Introduction
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Valencia's motion to

withdraw his guilty plea because he showed a just reason to withdraw his plea, and
there was no prejudice to the State. Mr. Valencia showed a just reason to withdraw his
plea because, based on inaccurate representations of his counsel, he did not
understand his options, and this rendered his plea involuntary and unknowing. Also,
allowing Mr. Valencia to withdraw his plea would not have prejudiced the Stateexercising a constitutional right to a jury trial, and requiring the State to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt - even if it requires the victim to undergo the unpleasant
experience of testifying or being uncertain of the outcome - does not amount to
"prejudice."

8.

Standard Of Review
Motions to withdraw guilty pleas are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c).

"The decision to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the sound discretion of
the district court," and that discretion should be "liberally applied." State v. Arthur, 145
Idaho 219, 222 (2008). An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea to determine "whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as
distinguished from arbitrary action." Id.
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C.

Plea Because His

When a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made before sentencing, a defendant
on!y has to show a "just reason" to withdraw the plea. State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799,
801 (1988). However, if the motion is made before sentencing but "after the defendant
has learned of the content of the PSI or has received other information about the
probable sentence, the district court may temper its liberality by weighing the
defendant's apparent motive." Arthur, 145 Idaho at 222. Also, if the State can show
prejudice as a result of the withdrawal, a motion to withdraw the plea will be denied.
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 61 (2004 ).

In this case, neither of these situations

applies-Mr. Valencia made his desire to withdraw his plea known before the PSI was
issued, and the State did not identify any prejudice to the State. Mr. Valencia also had
a just reason to withdraw his plea, and thus his motion should have been granted.
A defendant can show a just reason to withdraw a guilty plea if his plea was
involuntary. State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536 (Ct. App. 2008). "If a plea
was not taken in compliance with constitutional due process standards, which require
that a guilty plea be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, then ... 'just reason'
will be established as a matter of law." State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333 (Ct. App.
2009). A plea complies with these standards when:
(1) the plea was voluntary in the sense that the defendant understood the
nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) the defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront adverse
witnesses, and to avoid self-incrimination; and (3) the defendant
understood the consequences of pleading guilty.
State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887 (Ct. App. 2002). Here, Mr. Valencia's plea was

not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because, as a result of being misinformed about
10

the law regarding the persistent violator statute, he pleaded guilty.

Mr. Valencia

believed that he could be subject to the persistent violator statute if he did not plead
guilty because his original counsel (Mr. Dowdy) led him to believe that the two charges
he was facing would amount to his second and third felonies for the purpose of the
persistent violator statute.

(Tr. 12/30/13, p.13, L.11 - p.14, L.·19.) This was not

supported by the law. Charges in the same information "count as a single conviction for
purposes of establishing habitual offender status." State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563,
565 (Ct. App. 1999).

Thus, Mr. Valencia was not at risk of being subject to the

persistent violator statute as he believed.

Therefore, he did not knowingly and

intelligently waive his right to a trial.
In denying Mr. Valencia's motion, the district court focused on the idea that "there
was never any threat by the State to file the persistent violator because that was not
part of the plea agreement."

(Tr. 12/30/13, p.16, Ls.22-25.)

But this is irrelevant.

Mr. Valencia obviously believed, as a result of his prior counsel's erroneous
representations, that if he chose to go to trial, the State could later file an amended
information charging the persistent violator enhancement.

This is also supported by

Mr. Valencia's guilty plea advisory form, which he completed on July 8, 2013. There, in
response to the question of whether any promises had been made that influenced his
decision to plead guilty, Mr. Valencia wrote "Plea agreement & No file persistent" and
"Dismiss 3 Counts felony NCO." (R., p.54.)
More importantly, the district court erred when it found that "the motion to
withdraw the guilty plea was only filed after a very negative psychosexual evaluation
was performed and a presentence investigation report that recommended prison."
(Tr. 12/30/13, p.21, Ls.13-16.)

This finding ignored the fact that the only reason
11

Mr. Valencia's motion was filed after his PSI and psychosexual evaluation were
completed was because Mr. Valencia could not communicate with his original attorney
and that attorney withdrew. Even though Mr. Valencia's letter and motion, and certainly
Mr. Dowdy's motion to withdraw, made it clear that Mr. Valencia was trying to file his
motion before he read the PSI, the district court did not recognize that Mr. Valencia's
problems with Mr. Dowdy made it impossible for him to file a motion to withdraw his plea
when he wanted to.
In fact, the timeline makes it clear that Mr. Valencia wanted to file that motion
well before he saw his PSI.

His handwritten motion to withdraw his plea was dated

September 21, 2013. This was a notarized document.
Withdraw

Guilty

Plea

contemporaneously).

(file

stamped

10/2/13)

-

(See Letter and Motion to
augmented

to

the

record

But his psychosexual evaluation was not complete until

September 27, 2013. (See Psychosexual Evaluation.) Therefore, as discussed above,
he could not have seen the PSI, or the psychosexual evaluation before that date.
His desire to withdraw his plea early on is also supported by his statement to the
district court at the hearing on Mr. Dowdy's motion to withdraw as counsel and certainly
by the motion itself.

That motion was filed on September 25, 2013 and specifically

stated that "Defendant has requested counsel to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea
on the premise of ineffective assistance of counsel." (R., pp.66-67.)
Therefore, Mr. Valencia made at least three attempts to make it clear to the
district court that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea before the PSI was complete.
First, he tried to get Mr. Dowdy to file the motion, so the two of them obviously
discussed it well before the PSI was complete because Mr. Dowdy filed his motion to
withdraw as counsel on September 25, 2013. (R., pp.66-67.) Second, he tried to file
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his own motion by writing to the district court. (Letter and Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea (file stamped 10/2/13)- augmented to the record contemporaneously.)
And third, at Mr. Dowdy's motion to withdraw hearing, after the court had reset
his sentencing hearing for December, Mr. Valencia specificaily said to the district court
that when he met with Mr. Dowdy on September 16, 2013, he told him that he wanted to
withdraw his plea. (Tr. 10/21/13, p.9, Ls.5-21.) But, instead of acknowledging that a
delay might seriously impact his chances of being able to withdraw his plea, the district
court simply told Mr. Valencia to talk with his new attorney about motions he wanted to
file. (Tr. 10/21/13, p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.3.) Mr. Valencia's confusion is evident from the
transcript.

He asked "So what is December 16th? I don't - what is that, my

sentencing?" The district court explained that it had continued the sentencing to allow
the new attorney to "discuss with you how you want to proceed on this case."
(Tr. 10/21/13, p.10, Ls.13-16.) In a clear indication that Mr. Valencia had made up his
mind about how he wanted to proceed, he answered "I just said I would like to withdraw
my plea." (Tr. 10/21/13, p.10, Ls.19-20.) But the district court said Mr. Valencia would
need to talk with his new attorney who would file that motion for him. (Tr. 10/21 /13,
p.10, Ls.21-25.)
Because a thorough analysis of the timeline and motions proves that
Mr. Valencia not only had a just reason for withdrawing his plea but did not have an
improper motive, the district court should have applied the most liberal standard and
granted his motion. See Arthur, 145 at 222. Instead, while it actually acknowledged
that Mr. Valencia's "motion to withdraw the guilty plea was not filed until after the public
defender had the case again," it did not seem to recall the history of the case.
(Tr. 12/30/13, p.21, Ls.7-13.) Specifically, it did not recall that Mr. Valencia tried to file
13

his motion several times months before. The district court simply said that "certainly the
presentence investigation report and the psychosexual evaluation were available for
review prior to those times." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.21, Ls.7-13.) This statement showed that
that the district court either disregarded or forgot about Mr. Valencia's attempts to
withdraw his plea before the PSI and psychosexual report were availabie. Therefore,
the district court acted arbitrarily and abused its discretion when it denied the motion.

D.

Granting The Motion To Withdraw The Guilty Plea Would Not Have Prejudiced
The State, And The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Found That
There Was Prejudice To The State Based Onlv On The Fact That The Alleged
Victim Could Be Called To Testify
As indicated above, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will be denied if the State

can show prejudice as a result of the withdrawal. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 61
(2004 ). Prejudice to a party may occur when that party's ability to effectively present its
case is jeopardized by delay, the destruction of evidence or unavailability of witnesses.
See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 (1971 ). For example, if a significant
period of time passes before a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is entered, prejudice to
the State could certainly occur. In State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799 (1988), after entering
a guilty plea, the defendant did not appear for sentencing and was not apprehended
until three years later. Id. at 800. He subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court pointed out that the district court "recognized that
generally motions to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing are to be liberally allowed"
but noted with approval that the district court found that "Ballard's circumstances did not
warrant the granting of his motion."

Id.

It then quoted the district court, which

acknowledged that a liberal approach to such motions rests on "good principles," but
said that those principles "don't have much applicability where the defendant has

14

absented himself for a period of some three years. ! think that is a significant prejudice
to the prosecution and precludes the withdrawal of the plea at this point." Id.
Prejudice to the State is not relevant or applicable, however, when an alleged
victim must testify as a result of a defendant asserting a constitutional right to trial.
Here, the prosecutor actually acknowledged that there would not be prejudice to the
State, but then argued that there was "prejudice to the victim" because if the alleged
victim had to testify at a trial, she would have to "relive the night in question, even
though she's been given that opportunity to move forward, that obviously provides
prejudice." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.18, Ls.10-20.) In reply, Mr. Valencia's counsel argued that
"the psychological issues that the alleged victim may have in this matter" were not
relevant because the issue "shouid be prejudice to the State."
Ls.14-19.)

(Tr. 12/30/13, p.20,

He said that the State "can still call all their witnesses to trial.

All their

witnesses should still be available." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.20, Ls.19-22.) Nevertheless, the
district court agreed with the prosecutor. It said "[t]his Court does believe that there is
prejudice to the State, specifically prejudice to the victim in this case thinking this matter
had reached a resolution and the sentence was going forward."
L.23 - p.22, L.2.)

(Tr. 12/30/13, p.21,

This was a fundamental misunderstanding of the principle of

prejudice to the State. It allowed a more relaxed standard for a finding of prejudice to
the State in sex cases. Indeed, the prosecutor even implied that because this was not a
"dope case" or a "theft case," a different standard should apply.

(Tr. 12/30/13, p.17,

Ls.3-11.) Cf. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51-52 (2009) (clarifying that courts should not
apply different procedural rules in sex cases).
While victims' rights are crucial, a defendant's exercise of a constitutional right,
which requires that an alleged victim testify does not amount to prejudice to the State.

15

In fact, the United States Supreme Court, while recognizing that courts should "not
ignore the concerns of victims" especially "when the crime is one calling for public
testimony about a humiliating and degrading experience," made it clear that
"inconvenience and embarrassment to witnesses cannot justify failing to enforce
constitutional rights of an accused. When prejudicial error is made that dearly impairs a
defendant's constitutional rights, the burden of a new trial must be borne by the
prosecution, the courts, and the witnesses; the Constitution permits nothing less."
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). This admonition applies here.

Finally, as Mr. Valencia's counsel was obviously implying when he stated that the
issue "should be prejudice to the State," a victim being called to testify is not at all
unusual. It is unfortunate that alleged victims can sometimes be forced to recall painful
memories, but it is not prejudice to the State. Therefore, the district court abused its
discretion by considering this as a factor in its denial of Mr. Valencia's motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Valencia respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction and remand his case to the district court with direction to grant his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.

DATED this 1st day of December, 2014.
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